Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 53
Number 4 Still Crazy After All These Years: Is
Regulating Physician Practice an Exercise in
Futility? (Summer 2009)

Article 14

2009

The Limits to Life: What the D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Abigail
Alliance v. von Eschenbach Means for Medical Futility Statutes
Alicia Seibel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alicia Seibel, The Limits to Life: What the D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach
Means for Medical Futility Statutes, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol53/iss4/14

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LIMITS TO LIFE: WHAT THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN
ABIGAIL ALLIANCE v. VON ESCHENBACH MEANS FOR MEDICAL
FUTILITY STATUTES

INTRODUCTION
The specter of death is rarely met with open arms. The sick are told by
their friends and loved ones to fight their illnesses. Even after an ill individual
has become incapacitated and can no longer consent to the fight, the
individual’s family often insists on continuing medical treatment. Can a health
care provider determine that medical resources should not be used to assist that
fight if the provider decides that the fight is futile? May a state legislature
authorize providers to make that determination and act on it? If a provider has
made and implemented the decision to unilaterally terminate care pursuant to
state legislative authorization, how should a court evaluate that decision if it is
challenged?
The decision to withdraw medical treatment with the understanding that
death will shortly follow has received much recent attention,1 but the converse
of the “right to die”2 exists in the denial of treatment sought to prolong life
when a physician determines the treatment is simply prolonging a “biological
organism and not . . . a ‘life.’”3 Such treatment falls under the category of
medical futility.4 The majority of state legislatures have crafted statutes
permitting health care providers to deny treatment to patients if the provider
determines the treatment is medically inappropriate.5 While health care
providers are largely unwilling to employ such statutes to unilaterally abandon
or terminate treatment,6 the existence of such statutes indicates that state
1. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Not
only has Mrs. Schiavo’s case been given due process, but few, if any, similar cases have ever
been afforded this heightened level of process.” (quoting In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916
So.2d 814, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005))).
2. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (“This is the
first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the United States
Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as a ‘right to die.’”).
3. Daniel Robert Mordarski, Comment, Medical Futility: Has Ending Life Support Become
the Next “Pro-Choice/Right to Life” Debate?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 751, 752 (1993).
4. Id.
5. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007).
6. Id. at 4.
1321
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legislatures have recognized public policies supporting the denial of lifesustaining treatment in some circumstances.
In Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, an en banc D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a previous decision by a panel of the court to hold that
terminally ill individuals do not have a fundamental constitutional right to
access experimental drugs not yet approved for widespread use by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).7 By upholding the limitations placed on
public access to medicines as laid out in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) and FDA regulations enforcing those limitations, the court reaffirmed
that “the democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance
between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology.”8 The court
concluded that a patient at the end of his or her life cannot claim a
constitutional right to the treatment of his or her choosing if the federal
legislature has restricted access to that treatment.9
This Comment will discuss the role of courts in evaluating the availability
of desired medical treatment for the terminally ill in the context of state
medical futility statutes. This Comment will argue that under the current
models of state medical futility statutes, courts should not follow the D.C.
Circuit’s deferential lead. Part I examines the origins of medical futility
disputes and courts’ involvement in such disputes. Part II examines the
genesis of state futility dispute statutes and the currently advocated processbased model. Part III focuses on the FDCA, the regulations promulgated by
FDA under the FDCA, and the deference that courts have shown to FDA’s
judgment in response to challenges to FDA regulations. Part IV looks at the
reasoning of the court in Abigail Alliance. Finally, Part V provides a critical
analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s decision and argues that the court’s deference to
agency-placed limits on access to medical treatment in that case should not be
followed by courts when evaluating current state medical futility statutes, as
the current statutes entrust legislative interpretation to a small number of
private individuals and do not allow for judicial oversight of that interpretation.
I. THE ORIGINS OF MEDICAL FUTILITY DISPUTES
A.

Medical Futility Generally

A medical futility dispute emerges when a physician believes further
treatment is no longer appropriate but the patient’s family or surrogate wants
treatment continued.10 The family or surrogate might want treatment to be

7.
8.
9.
10.

495 F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 713.
Id.
Mordarski, supra note 3, at 752.
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continued because they believe the physician’s prognosis is wrong, they are in
denial about the patient’s realistic chances of recovery, or they believe a
miracle will occur.11 Alternately, the physician might want treatment
discontinued for reasons of professional integrity, due to concern for the
patient’s well-being, so as to prevent the patient’s family from experiencing
false hope, and to maximize limited health resources.12
The concept of medical futility began with physician- or provideradvocated withholding or withdrawal of life support systems or the removal of
food and hydration from a patient in a prolonged vegetative state.13 Under
such circumstances, the physician or provider found the prolonging of the
patient’s life to be “legally, ethically and medically inappropriate.”14 In the
1990s, professional medical associations, institutions, and providers began
enacting policies and guidelines to allow providers to unilaterally discontinue
“medically inappropriate” care even when the patient’s family or surrogate
wants the treatment continued.15
While the notion of treatment that constitutes “medical inappropriateness”
in medical futility disputes was initially limited to providing life support or
food and hydration to a patient in a persistent vegetative state, that definition
has expanded.16 Now there is no consensus in the medical community, the
bioethical community, or among the public as to what constitutes medical
inappropriateness.17 Definitions of medical inappropriate care vary, often
depending on the circumstances,18 and no definition of medical futility has
been universally accepted.19
The attempt to define medical futility in terms of clinical criteria has been
considered the “first generation” of the medical futility debate.20 The
narrowest definition of medical futility uses brain death as a standard for

11. Pope, supra note 5, at 10–11.
12. Id. at 15–18.
13. See Mordarski, supra note 3, at 752.
14. Cf. id. (noting that in early “right to die” cases physicians typically asserted that
withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatment was “legally, ethically and medically
inappropriate”)
15. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4.
16. See id. at 26.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Bryan Rowland, Comment, Communicating Past the Conflict: Solving the Medical
Futility Controversy with Process-Based Approaches, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271,
277 (2006) (quoting AscensionHealth.org, Health Care Ethics: Futility, http://www.ascension
health.org/ethics/public/issues/futility.asp (last visited July 22, 2009)).
20. Jeffrey P. Burns & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987,
1988 (2007).
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medical inappropriateness.21 Brain death is considered the only situation
where medical intervention of any sort is considered futile,22 and “[t]here is a
consensus that it is ethically, legally, and medically appropriate to stop
[treatment] for a brain-dead patient.”23
The next most restrictive definition of medical inappropriateness is
physiological futility.24 Physiological futility refers to treatment that will
produce no measurable effect on the patient, and such an evaluation is
objective.25 Providers are able to determine physiological futility based on
clinical knowledge, and “[e]ven the biggest opponents of unilateral decision
making” would agree medical treatment with no physiological effect could be
properly refused by a provider.26
The last two definitions of futile care are more expansive. Both definitions
are subjective. The first definition is a quantitative standard of futility, which
depends upon a consensus of whether the treatment sought can achieve the
patient’s goals for recovery.27 The second definition is a qualitative standard
of futility, which depends upon the physician’s evaluation of whether the
patient’s goals for recovery are worth pursuing.28 Qualitative futility is found
in three forms: where the potential burdens to the patient outweigh the benefits
to the patient, where the potential benefits to the patient are not worth the
health care resources to be consumed, and where the treatment sought will not
“provide the patient a quality of life worth living.”29
The various definitions of medical futility have been debated for years,
with only brain death and physiological futility supported by a consensus in the
medical, legal, and bioethical communities.30 However, those communities

21. Robert D. Truog, Brain Death—Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 276–77 (2007).
22. Id. at 277.
23. Pope, supra note 5, at 27.
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 28–29.
26. Id. at 29–30.
27. Pope, supra note 5, at 32.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id. at 35. While the debate about medically inappropriate care did at one point
contemplate a cost-benefits analysis of the treatment sought as a method for drawing the line at
where treatment became futile, current evaluations of futility standards have been careful to
differentiate between futility and rationing. See Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989–90
(“[R]ationing arguments must always balance the benefits of a diagnostic or therapeutic
intervention against its costs . . . . Futility arguments are fundamentally different, in that they
claim that the intervention in question is devoid of benefit . . . . In light of this distinction, it
should be clear that futility policies should never be invoked as a method of cost control.”); see
also Rowland, supra note 19, at 279 (“Futility is not rationing health care.”). This Comment will
not discuss rationing as a form of evaluating medical futility.
30. Pope, supra note 5, at 41.
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failed to arrive at a consensus on the definition of medical futility under other
circumstances that more commonly give rise to medical futility disputes.31
The lack of a universal definition of medical futility resulted in one hospital’s
reluctance to terminate care even when such care met the hospital’s own
definition of futility.32 Despite the presence of a futility policy, health care
providers did not halt futile treatment.33 The ineffectiveness of this first
generation of futility definitions led to another model for approaching the
definition of futility.
Identifying medical futility disputes through a defined set of procedural
steps has been considered the “second generation” of the medical futility
debate.34 Under this approach, hospitals use an internal ethics committees to
determine if the treatment sought by a patient’s surrogate is futile and then
follow a defined set of steps that can lead to unilateral termination of care if no
agreement with the family can be reached or alternate arrangements can be
made.35 If the ethics committee supports the physicians’ view that treatment is
futile, the hospital negotiates with the patient’s family to attempt to arrive at a
consensus for continued care.36 If such a consensus cannot be reached, the
hospital will try to transfer the patient to a facility that will provide the care
sought.37 If such a provider cannot be found, the hospital could try to have an
alternate surrogate appointed by a court, with the assumption that the alternate
surrogate will be more amenable to negotiation.38 If the attempt to appoint an
alternate surrogate is unsuccessful, the hospital could unilaterally withdraw
care.39 Many hospitals nationwide have adopted the procedural approach as
hospital policy.40 As part of hospital policy, the decision to unilaterally
terminate care is open to challenge through the legal system.41

31. Id. at 41–42.
32. See Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989–88.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1989.
35. Pope, supra note 5, at 23. While there are no set requirements for the membership of a
hospital ethics committee, membership of such committees typically consists of doctors, nurses,
and other hospital employees. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1990–91. Most committees also
have non-medical personnel members from the local community, but “these are often grateful
former patients of the hospital.” Id.
36. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989. These challenges could arise in the form of
civil, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions. Pope, supra note 5, at 43. Common civil claims filed
against providers after the unilateral termination of treatment include actions for informed
consent, medical malpractice, and wrongful death. Id. Common criminal charges filed against
providers include patient neglect and murder. Id. at 47. Disciplinary sanctions against a provider
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The American Medical Association (AMA) endorsed a process-based
approach in 1999, noting that “definitions of futile care are value laden” and
that “universal consensus on futility care is unlikely to be achieved.”42 The
process recommended by the AMA involved seven steps in total, “aimed at
deliberation and resolution including all involved parties, . . . securing
alternatives in the case of irreconcilable differences, and . . . closure when all
alternatives have been exhausted.”43
Prior to the enactment of state medical futility statutes, many professional
medical associations, health care providers, and institutions decided that it
would be appropriate for providers to withhold or withdraw treatment
unilaterally in cases of medical disputes and enacted policies reflecting this
determination.44 These policies took the form of both clinical definitions of
futile care and process-based approaches to resolving medical futility disputes.
As hospital policies, any decision arrived at by the treating physician or the
hospital ethics committee was open to judicial challenge by the patient’s
family or surrogate.45 As such, despite the presence of these policies,
providers were still reluctant to act for fear of the legal repercussions.46 In
response, state legislatures began passing medical futility statutes to offer
providers that protection.47
B.

Medical Futility Cases Prior to State Statutes: Hospital Ethics
Committees

There are limited court judgments evaluating health care providers’
decisions to unilaterally withhold or terminate treatment prior to the enactment
of state medical futility statutes.48 Under such circumstances, the providers
were relying upon their own policies authorizing the unilateral removal or
cessation of treatment.49 In the absence of state statutes protecting unilateral
treatment decisions, providers often depended on the evaluation of a hospital’s
ethics committee to buttress the treating physician’s determination that the care

typically include damages under state health care decision statutes for failing to comply with
patient and surrogate decisions when “intentional statutory violations occur.” Id. at 49.
42. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Medical Futility in End-of-Life
Care: Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 281 JAMA 937, 937 (1999).
43. Id.
44. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4.
45. Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989.
46. Pope, supra note 5, at 4.
47. See Id. at 53; see also Rowland, supra note 19, at 308 (discussing the Texas Advanced
Directive Act of 1999).
48. See Mordarski, supra note 3, at 762.
49. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4.
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sought by the patient’s surrogate was medically inappropriate.50 The support
for the doctor’s determination would be used to attempt to sway the patient’s
surrogate to accede to the withdrawal or termination of treatment.51 While
process-based hospital policies required the use of an ethics committee to
arrive at the determination that treatment sought was futile, hospitals
employing policies involving a clinical definition of futility also often used
ethics committees.
If an ethics committee was involved in the decision to unilaterally halt
treatment, the decision was used by hospitals as evidence in lawsuits brought
by surrogates objecting to that decision. The decision of the ethics committee
was often convincing to a judge or jury. In Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, the daughter of a deceased elderly patient sued Massachusetts
General Hospital after the hospital disconnected her comatose father’s life
support in violation of her instructions.52 After the hospital presented evidence
that the treating physician had obtained an ethics consultation and the
subsequent approval of the head of the ethics committee to remove life
support, a jury refused to award damages against the hospital.53
The evaluation of an ethics committee is not always persuasive. In Rideout
v. Hershey Medical Center, the court imposed liability on a hospital for ending
life support for an incompetent patient in violation of the surrogate’s wishes.54
In Rideout, the parents of a two-year-old girl who had a malignant tumor in her
brain brought a wrongful death action after the treating physician determined
her condition was incurable and deteriorating, and therefore, unilaterally
removed her ventilator.55 The physician had the approval of the hospital’s
ethics committee,56 but the court nonetheless found the hospital liable for the
patient’s death.57
Similarly, the evaluation of an ethics committee is not always considered
useful for evaluating the issue before the court in a dispute relating to medical
futility. The court in In re Howe found the ethics committee’s evaluation of
futility irrelevant to its decision of whether to remove the patient’s surrogate
from her role.58 In Howe, the court ordered the surrogate of a patient suffering

50. Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of
Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 185 (2001).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 83–84 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995); see
also Cantor, supra note 50, at 186 (discussing the Rideout case).
55. Rideout, 30 Pa. D & C 4th at 59–62.
56. Id. at 62.
57. Id. at 70; see also Cantor, supra note 50, at 186.
58. In re Howe, No. 03-P-1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *20–21 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct.
Dept. Mar. 22, 2004).
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from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis to make her decisions based on an
assessment of the patient’s best interests.59 The court felt that there was
insufficient evidence to find that the surrogate, who was the patient’s sister,
should be removed for insisting on life-sustaining treatment even after the
hospital determined that the treatment demanded was inappropriate.60 While
the court did not determine whether the treatment demanded by the surrogate
was inappropriate or that the hospital must conform to the surrogate’s wishes,
it did not defer to the ethics committee’s evaluation. The patient’s surrogate
and the hospital eventually arrived at an agreement to extend aggressive lifesustaining care, and the patient died less than a month before treatment was
scheduled to be terminated.61
The court in Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center62 also found the hospital
ethics committee’s futility determination irrelevant to the issue before it. In
Causey, the court held that a physician’s liability for unilaterally removing life
support from a comatose patient depended on whether the physician deviated
from the standard of care.63 While the hospital’s Morals and Ethics Board
agreed with the physician’s decision to discontinue life-support treatment, the
court found that the complaint raised by the patient’s surrogate must first be
submitted to a medical review panel for a determination of whether the
physician and the Board departed from the prevailing standard of care.64 The
court found such determination required under the Louisiana Medical
Malpractice Act, rendering the surrogate’s claim premature without it.65
In some situations the ethics committee will not go along with the treating
physician’s determination that medical care is inappropriate.66 In In re Helga
Wanglie, a hospital sought a judicial determination that it could change the
guardian for a permanently comatose patient after the guardian, the patient’s
husband, insisted on the continuation of life support.67 Prior to seeking judicial
assistance, the hospital’s ethics committee evaluated the situation and
concluded that the hospital staff should continue treatment.68 The judge

59. Id. at *21.
60. Id. at *20–21.
61. Richard Moore, An End-of-Life Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When
Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment that Physicians Are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 433, 467 (2007).
62. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
63. Id. at 1076.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mordarski, supra note 3, at 763–64.
67. See id. at 764–65 (discussing In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County,
Minn., 4th Dist. Ct., P. Ct. Div. July 1, 1991) (unreported opinion)); see also Cantor, supra note
50, at 185.
68. Mordarski, supra note 3, at 763–64.
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determined that the husband would remain as guardian and life support was
continued.69
Finally, prior to the enactment of medical futility statutes, not all cases
relating to the cessation of treatment involved a hospital ethics committee’s
determination. In Velez v. Bethune, the court held that a physician had no right
to independently decide to discontinue the medical treatment of an infant even
if the child was terminally ill and about to die.70 The child was born on the
side of a highway after a twenty-four week gestation period and died nine days
later, after the treating physician ordered the discontinuation of resuscitation.71
The mother of the child alleged in her complaint that the treating physician
discontinued medical care without discussing the decision with her or the
child’s father.72 The court made no mention of the involvement of an ethics
committee in the physician’s decision to halt treatment, and the court found
that the treating physician could not decide on his own to terminate medical
treatment of the child.73
Medical futility disputes arise when a health care provider determines that
treatment desired by a patient or the patient’s surrogate is not medically
appropriate. Before the enactment of state statutes authorizing providers to
unilaterally deny or terminate medically inappropriate treatment, providers did
decide to restrict such treatment. These decisions were made pursuant to
hospital policies that often included consultations with a hospital ethics
committee in an attempt to persuade the patient or surrogate to agree to the
cessation of treatment. In the few situations where a physician halted life
support and the patient’s surrogate took the issue to court, the decisions of
hospital ethics committees were given varying weight in the courts’ final
decision and were not always dispositive. Thus, a hospital seeking to
discontinue medically inappropriate care could not depend on the treating
physician’s evaluation, the ethic committee’s determination, or the authority of
its own policies to withstand judicial scrutiny.
II. THE ENACTMENT OF STATE FUTILITY STATUTES
A.

The Different Types of State Futility Statutes

In the early 1990s, many states enacted legislation allowing health care
providers to unilaterally refuse to provide treatment that they consider
medically inappropriate.74 Prior to the enactment of medical futility statutes,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 764.
Velez v. Bethune, 466 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 629.
Pope, supra note 5, at 50.
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commentators had argued for their establishment.75 These statutes have taken
several different forms.
1.

The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act

The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA) was drafted in 1993 to
allow an individual to preemptively create a plan to specify what health care he
or she would desire in all situations and to resolve state conflicts in advance
health-care directives.76 In addition to permitting the individual to decline
treatment or request that treatment be discontinued, the UHCDA authorized a
health care provider to decline to honor a request for treatment “for reasons of
conscience or if the instruction or decision requires the provision of medically
ineffective care or care contrary to applicable health-care standards.”77 No
other definition of “medically ineffective care or care contrary to applicable
health-care standards” is given by the UHCDA. The UHCDA has been
adopted by more states than any other model of state futility statute.78 After it
was completed, the UHCDA was codified by ten states over the course of the
next twelve years.79
The UHCDA outlines a process that a health care provider must follow if it
wishes to unilaterally terminate a patient’s treatment.80 First, the provider
informs the patient or surrogate that it wishes to terminate the treatment.81
Second, the provider must “immediately make all reasonable efforts” to
transfer the patient to another provider willing to continue the treatment
requested, while the current provider still continues supplying the treatment.82
75. See, e.g., Mordarski, supra note 3, at 783 (“Although the issue of communication and
medical futility is best resolved within the medical community itself, if the medical community
does not accept this responsibility, then each state legislature should become involved.”).
76. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1–19, 9 U.L.A. 83–129 (2005 & Supp. 2008),
reprinted in 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 83, 83 (2006). The Act was recommended for enactment in all
states at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, held from July 30 to August 6, 1993, and was approved by the American Bar Association
on February 7, 1994.
77. Id. at 83–84.
78. Pope, supra note 5, at 53.
79. Id. at 53; see also ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -13 (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.52.010 to .395 (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600 –4806 (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501–2518 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 327E-1 to -16 (2008); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5-801 to -817 (Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to -229
(2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-1801 to 1815 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-401 to -416 (2007).
80. Pope, supra note 5, at 54.
81. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(g), 9 U.L.A. 118–19.
82. Id. The provider’s inability to find another provider willing to continue treatment
“serves as a check on the system to be sure that the hospital’s position is not out of line with
medical standards within the community at large.” Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1989. This
then serves to establish the standard of care for the patient. The plaintiff in a medical malpractice
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If the provider is unable to find another provider to take the patient, however,
then the provider may refuse the treatment request.83 The patient or surrogate
may petition the courts for judicial relief to “enjoin or direct a health-care
decision or order other equitable relief” if the patient or surrogate disagrees
with the decision made.84
2.

Other State Futility Statutes

The UHCDA is not the only form of state futility statute. Other states have
adopted statutes authorizing the unilateral withholding or withdrawal of
medically inappropriate treatment by a health care provider. Other state
futility statutes can be distinguished by their various definitions of what
constitutes medically inappropriate treatment.85 Some statutes provide no
definition of medical inappropriateness.86 Most statutes offer some definition
of medical inappropriateness, including definitions based on “usual and
customary standards of medical practice,”87 “reasonable medical standards,”88
“responsible medical practice,”89 and “accepted medical standards.”90
Still other states have medical futility statutes in place that are considered
“narrow” statutes.91 These statutes permit unilateral decisions in carefully
defined circumstances.92 These statutes offer tighter restrictions on the type of
treatment that can be discontinued, what the expected effect of the treatment
must be before it can be discontinued, and the extent to which a provider may
take action where a surrogate has requested treatment.93

case must prove the standard of medical care and show that the defendant-physician departed
from that standard of care in treating the plaintiff. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care
Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist As Determined by Local, “Like Community,” State,
National, or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4th 603, 606–07 (1982). If the hospital can show that
other area hospitals refused to treat the patient in the manner requested, the hospital can establish
that it did not deviate from the relevant standard of care by refusing to treat the patient in the
manner requested and can therefore rebut a charge of medical malpractice. Id.
83. See Pope, supra note 5, at 60–61; see UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(e)–(g) at
118–19 (noting that a provider who refuses to continue medically ineffective care “shall . . .
provide continuing care to the patient until a transfer can be effected”).
84. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 125, 129.
85. Pope, supra note 5, at 57.
86. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(A)(4) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.12990(A) (2005).
87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
88. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-10(3) (2006 & Supp. 2008); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
45/4-8(c) (2008).
89. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:7(I) (LexisNexis 2006).
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-31-2 (LexisNexis 2006).
91. Pope, supra note 5, at 64.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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First, with regards to the type of treatment that can be discontinued, some
“narrow” statutes authorize providers to unilaterally withhold only CPR.94
Other statutes authorize providers to unilaterally withhold only “artificially
administered nutrition and hydration.”95
Second, with regards to the expected effect of the treatment sought to be
discontinued, some statutes authorize providers to make unilateral decisions
These
only under certain definitions of medical inappropriateness.96
definitions include situations involving brain death, physiological futility, or
permanent unconsciousness.97
Finally, with regards to the extent to which a provider may take action
where a surrogate has requested treatment, some statutes authorize providers to
unilaterally withhold or withdraw treatment only when neither the patient nor
the patient’s surrogate has provided opposing directions.98
B.

Court Challenges to State Futility Statutes

Since state medical futility statutes are a recent phenomenon, and given
that health care providers are still reluctant to take unilateral action despite the
presence of such statutes, few cases deal with challenges to state medical
futility statutes after a provider has terminated treatment in opposition to a
surrogate’s wishes.
1.

Direct Challenges to State Medical Futility Statutes

Hudson v. Texas Children’s Hospital99 was the first case in which a court
upheld a provider’s decision to withdraw life-sustaining care while the patient
was still alive on the basis of a state medical futility statute.100 In Hudson, the
mother of an infant born with thanatophoric dysplasia sought an injunction to
require the hospital to continue providing life-sustaining care to her child.101
Thanatophoric dysplasia, a rare and fatal type of dwarfism,102 required the
child to be placed on a ventilator.103 The child’s treating physicians
determined that continuing treatment was inappropriate.104 The hospital’s

94. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9708 (2007).
95. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.580 (2007).
96. Pope, supra note 5, at 65.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.580.
99. 177 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (remanding the case following the trial
judge’s refusal to recuse himself). On remand, the trial judge refused to issue an injunction to
force the hospital to continue medical care. Moore, supra note 61, at 461.
100. Moore, supra note 61, at 466.
101. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 233.
102. Moore, supra note 61, at 461.
103. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 233.
104. Id.
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bioethics committee agreed with the decision and informed the mother that the
hospital would discontinue treatment within ten days unless she found another
hospital willing to provide care.105
The process followed by the hospital was done in accordance with the
Texas Advance Directives Act106 (Texas Act), which sets out a process-based
approach for medical futility decisions.107 Under that approach, the hospital
informs the patient’s surrogate of the physicians’ adverse decision; reviews the
decision using the hospital’s ethics committee; if the committee supports the
adverse decision, the hospital assists the surrogate in finding a facility willing
to provide treatment; and ultimately, if such a facility cannot be found, the
physician terminates treatment.108
While the mother in Hudson brought claims under several federal and state
statutes, the only claim that survived the hospital’s motion for summary
judgment was her claim for injunctive relief under the Texas Act.109 If
granted, the injunction sought in Hudson would have forced the hospital to
continue providing life-sustaining care for a period longer than the statutory
period required while the hospital searched for another willing provider.110
This is the only remedy available under the Texas Act.111 The trial judge
entered a temporary restraining order preventing the hospital from halting
treatment during the ensuing litigation, but ultimately denied her injunction.112
Although a procedural error by the judge led to an appeal and reversal of his
denial, on remand the trial judge affirmed the denial.113 The hospital withdrew
the life-sustaining treatment, and the child died moments afterwards.114
2.

Federal Preemption Under EMTALA

Other judicial evaluations of state futility statutes have found such statutes
preempted by federal law. For example, In re Baby K the court found that the
treatment requirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) superseded a state futility statute.115 In Baby K, the court held

105. Id.
106. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.001 to .166 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2008).
107. Moore, supra note 61, at 462.
108. Id. at 459–60.
109. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 234.
110. Id.
111. See § 166.046(g).
112. Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 235.
113. Moore, supra note 61, at 461.
114. Id.
115. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) [hereinafter EMTALA]. The EMTALA
statute states:
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that a hospital was required to provide stabilizing treatment to an infant even
though the hospital considered the treatment medically inappropriate.116 In its
argument for discontinuing care, the hospital relied on the Health Care
Decisions Act of Virginia, which provided that “[n]othing in this article shall
be construed to require a physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to
a patient that the physician determines to be medically or ethically
inappropriate.”117 The hospital in Baby K also attacked its obligations under
EMTALA, arguing its duties to provide adequate screening and stabilization of
emergency care patients under that Act did not include the care sought by Baby
K’s mother.118
In Baby K, the hospital sought a declaratory judgment that it was not
required to provide treatment other than nutrition, hydration, and warmth to an
anencephalic infant.119 Anencephaly is a condition in which a child is born
without major portions of the brain, skull, and scalp.120 Baby K did have a
brain stem, enabling her to perform basic physiological functions, but she
lacked a cerebrum and was therefore permanently unconscious.121 Baby K’s
treating physician explained to her mother that life support services were
inappropriate, but her mother insisted that the doctors continue providing Baby
K with mechanical breathing assistance when she had trouble breathing on her
own.122 Baby K was discharged to a nursing home, but she was readmitted
three times to the emergency room after she had trouble breathing.123 The
hospital sought the declaratory judgment after Baby K’s second admission.124
The court in Baby K upheld the duties required by EMTALA over the
hospital’s right to terminate care it found medically inappropriate.125 The court
in Baby K found that the hospital’s desire to withhold care conflicted with the

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual
. . . comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual’s behalf
for examination or treatment . . . , the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical
screening examination . . . .
. . . [A]nd [if] the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical
condition, the hospital must provide either . . . for such further medical examination and
such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or for transfer of the
individual to another medical facility . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b)(1).
116. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597–98.
117. Id. at 597 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (2005)).
118. Id. at 595.
119. Id. at 592.
120. Id.
121. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592.
122. Id. at 592–93.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 598.
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hospital’s duty to provide stabilizing treatment for Baby K under EMTALA.126
The court determined that Virginia’s state medical futility statute was
preempted in this situation by EMTALA.127
Other judicial decisions have subsequently clarified the decision of the
court in Baby K and noted that EMTALA was not intended to govern medical
care beyond that which was required to immediately stabilize a patient seeking
emergency care. In Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of University of Virginia, the
same court that decided Baby K again addressed the issue of a whether a
hospital’s unilateral decision to terminate a patient’s care violated
EMTALA.128 In Bryan, the court held that a hospital’s decision to enter an
anti-resuscitation order for an elderly patient and then not resuscitate the
patient after her heart attack eight days later did not violate EMTALA.129 The
patient had been admitted to the hospital emergency room with respiratory
distress, and twelve days after her admittance the hospital staff entered a “do
not resuscitate” order for her against her family’s wishes.130 The court in
Bryan found that Congress intended EMTALA “to regulate the hospital’s care
of the patient only in the immediate aftermath of the act of admitting her for
emergency treatment” and could not “plausibly be interpreted to regulate
medical and ethical decisions outside that narrow context.”131
In re AMB, the Michigan Court of Appeals similarly strictly construed the
emergency care requirements of EMTALA.132 The court in AMB held that a
family court improperly entered an order withdrawing life support from a
premature infant, Baby Allison, because the court failed to properly notify
Baby Allison’s parents.133 After life support had been withdrawn and the child
had died, attorneys representing the Family Independence Agency of the
family court and Baby Allison agreed to present arguments to the court to
“clarify the record and examine the issues.”134 When evaluating the claim that
the family court’s order to withdraw life support from Baby Allison violated
the hospital’s duty to provide stabilization under EMTALA, the court
distinguished the situation in Baby K from Baby Allison’s circumstances.135
The court noted that Baby Allison was never admitted for emergency care and
that the hospital did not try to treat Baby Allison any differently than other

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
Id.
Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 349–50 (4th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 352.
In re AMB, 640 N.W.2d 262, 286 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 289.
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patients requiring her treatment.136 The court found EMTALA inapplicable for
other reasons, noting that “[t]he standards EMTALA puts in place affecting
treatment specifically control hospital conduct, not patient autonomy or
decisions by appropriate surrogates.”137 Despite the ruling of the court in Baby
K, that EMTALA preempted a state medical statute, the subsequent decisions
of Bryan and AMB indicate a judicial unwillingness to extend EMTALA
beyond Congress’ stated purpose of prohibiting patient-dumping.
3.

Other Federal Preemption Challenges to Medical Futility Statutes

Despite the lack of litigation contesting state medical futility statutes,
commentators have recognized other potential federal preemption issues with
regards to state medical futility statutes apart from EMTALA. Among these
challenges is unconstitutionality.138 The unilateral termination of treatment
may violate a patient’s First Amendment rights if the patient or surrogate
demands treatment based on religious convictions.139 A patient’s Eighth
Amendment rights may be violated if the patient is a prisoner and thus such
termination may be considered cruel and unusual punishment.140 It has been
argued that “unilateral termination is inconsistent with equal protection, the
right to life, and the freedom of expression.”141 It has also been held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the unilateral
discontinuation of medical treatment.142
C. Current State Futility Statutes
Despite the risk of federal preemption under EMTALA or the risk of
unconstitutionality, state medical futility statutes are still being employed. The
state that has had the most success with its futility statute is Texas; assuming
that success is measured as the ability of a provider to lean on the state’s
medical futility statute as a means of unilaterally terminating treatment.143
Texas employs a process-based futility statute.144
At the first stage, an ethics committee reviews the treating physician’s
decision that continuing treatment would be inappropriate.145 The patient’s
surrogate must be notified forty-eight hours before the review and is entitled to

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
AMB, 640 N.W.2d at 289.
Pope, supra note 5, at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pope, supra note 5, at 1.
Id. at 79; see also supra text accompanying notes 107–108.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2008).
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attend the meeting and receive a written explanation of the committee’s
decision.146
The second stage begins after the ethics committee decides to terminate
treatment. At this stage, the provider must try to transfer the patient to a
provider that is willing to continue treatment.147 The provider must continue to
provide the treatment sought throughout the first and second stages and for ten
days after the ethics committee hands down its decision to the patient’s
surrogate.148 If the provider cannot find a provider willing to continue the
treatment, the provider may unilaterally stop treatment on the eleventh day.149
Under the Texas statute, a patient’s surrogate cannot challenge the decision
of the hospital ethics committee in court.150 The only judicial recourse
available for a surrogate is an injunction to extend the ten-day period after the
provider determines that it will end treatment.151 The court is permitted to
extend the time period “only if the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that there is a reasonable expectation that a physician or health care
facility that will honor the patient’s directive will be found if the time
extension is granted.”152 Under Texas law, then, a hospital ethics committee’s
evaluation that a treatment sought is futile is a final decision on the merits.
Commentators have suggested that the reason Texas’s state medical futility
statute has been so effective is because it is focused on a definite process.153
While other state statutes rely on imprecise standards to identify “medically
inappropriate” medicine, Texas’s statute defines a provider’s duty solely in
terms of process and is the only state statute to do so.154 Accordingly, Texas’s
statute is considered the only effective state medical futility statute,155 and its
process-based approach is considered the best method for resolving medical
futility disputes.156 Several commentators have argued that other states should
model their medical futility statutes on Texas’s.157

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. § 166.046(b).
Id. § 166.046(d).
Id. § 166.046(e).
Id.
Burns & Truog, supra note 20, at 1991.
See id.; see also § 166.046(g).
§ 166.046(g).
Pope, supra note 5, at 80.
Id. at 1, 80.
Id. at 1.
Moore, supra note 61, at 468; see also Rowland, supra note 19, at 274.
Rowland, supra note 19, at 309; see also Pope, supra note 5, at 1.
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III. THE FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT: THE ENACTMENT OF THE FDCA,
FDA REGULATIONS, AND CHALLENGES TO BOTH
A.

The Legislative History of the FDCA

The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was passed by Congress in
1938 “[t]o prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of adulterated and
misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and for other purposes.”158 In
1962, the FDCA was amended to add specific requirements that must be met
before the drugs receive approval by FDA.159 The amendments were enacted
“[t]o protect the public health by amending the [FDCA] to assure the safety,
effectiveness, and reliability of drugs, authorize standardization of drug names,
and clarify and strengthen existing inspection authority; and for other
purposes.”160 These 1962 amendments to the FDCA were at issue in Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach.161
Under the FDCA, “[n]o person shall introduce . . . into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application [is] filed . . .
with respect to such a drug.”162 Such an application will not be approved by
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the absence of “adequate
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is
safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested,” if
“the results of such tests . . . do not show that such drug is safe for use under
such conditions,” if there is “insufficient information to determine whether
such drug is safe for use under such conditions,” or if “the information
submitted . . . as part of the application . . . [shows] a lack of substantial
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports.”163
To meet the requirements of the FDCA, FDA promulgated detailed
regulations that must be followed by the proponent of a new drug. The current
FDA approval process that a new drug must undergo before it can be marketed
to the general public has three basic phases.164 A fourth post-marketing
investigational phase may be conducted to ascertain additional information
about the “drug’s risks, benefits, and optimal use.”165 An investigational new

158. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
159. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
160. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 780 (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
161. 495 F.3d 695, 705. (D.C. Cir. 2007).
162. 21 U.S.C. §355(a).
163. Id. § 355(d).
164. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008).
165. Id. § 312.85.
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drug application (IND) may be submitted for clinical investigation in one or
more phases.166
The approval process begins when a drug sponsor submits an IND to FDA,
indicating that the sponsor intends to conduct clinical studies on an
investigational drug.167 A sponsor “may be an individual or pharmaceutical
company, governmental agency, academic institution, private organization, or
other organization.”168 The IND must include the sponsor’s general plan for
investigation and the protocols intended to be followed for human testing.169
FDA has set out a specific and detailed format that an IND must take,170 and a
sponsor must annually report on an IND to describe the status of current
studies and update the plan for the upcoming year.171 An IND goes into effect
and authorizes a sponsor to begin its investigation thirty days after FDA
receives the IND, unless FDA notifies the sponsor that a clinical hold has been
placed on the IND, or on earlier notification to the sponsor that the
investigation can begin.172
In the first phase, the investigational new drug is introduced to human
subjects in studies on patients or volunteer subjects.173 The total number of
subjects in a Phase 1 study is typically between twenty and eighty.174 Phase 1
studies are designed to evaluate how the drug affects humans, “the side effects
associated with increasing doses,” and “gain early evidence on [the drug’s]
effectiveness.”175 To pass on to Phase 2, Phase 1 studies must gather an
adequate amount of “information about the drug’s pharmacokinetics and
pharmacological effects.”176 In addition to studies evaluating the drug’s side
effects, Phase 1 also includes separate studies that evaluate “drug metabolism,
structure-activity relationships, and mechanism of action in humans” and
“explore biological phenomena or disease processes” through use of the
investigational new drug as a research tool.177
In the second phase, the investigational new drug is subject to more “wellcontrolled, scientifically valid . . . studies.”178 The total number of subjects in

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. § 312.21.
Id. § 312.20(a).
Id. § 312.3(b).
21 C.F.R. § 312.22(c).
Id. § 312.23.
Id. § 312.22(c).
Id. § 312.40(b)(1)–(2).
Id. § 312.21(a)(1).
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 312.21(a)(2).
Id. § 312.21(a)(1).
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a Phase 2 study is typically no more than several hundred.179 Phase 2 studies
are used “to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication”
in patients afflicted “with the disease or condition under study”.180
To reach the third and usually final phase, there must be “preliminary
evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug.”181 Once such evidence has
been obtained, Phase 3 studies expand the previous studies into controlled and
uncontrolled studies.182 The total number of subjects in Phase 3 studies is
typically between several hundred and several thousand.183 The purpose of
Phase 3 studies is to collect the information required “to evaluate the overall
benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for
physician labeling.”184
Throughout the three basic phases of the FDA approval process, FDA
reviews the IND.185 FDA’s purpose is to monitor “the safety and rights of [the
human] subjects” in Phase I and “help assure that the quality of the scientific
evaluation of drugs is adequate to permit an evaluation of the drug’s
effectiveness and safety” in Phases 2 and 3.186 If at any point FDA feels that a
deficiency exists in a clinical investigation, FDA will try to resolve the matter
with the sponsor or place a clinical hold on the IND.187 Once a drug receives
FDA approval by passing through all phases of FDA’s specified process, the
drug’s sponsor may begin to market it to the general public.188
B.

Judicial Challenges to the FDCA

The FDCA has previously been challenged by groups desiring earlier
access to investigational drugs making their way through the FDA approval
process. These challenges have helped shape an understanding of the
regulatory approval process outlined by FDA to put the text of the FDCA into
action and to what extent a drug sponsor or drug consumer may oppose the
process.
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rutherford examined the
application of the FDA approval process to drugs for the terminally ill.189 In
Rutherford, the Supreme Court held that there is no express or implicit
exemption from the approval process in the FDCA for drugs going to

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
Id. § 312.21(b).
Id. § 312.21(c).
Id.
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 312.42(c)–(d).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 546 (1979).
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terminally ill patients.190 The plaintiffs in Rutherford, a group of terminally ill
individuals and their spouses filed suit to enjoin FDA from interfering with the
shipment and sale of laetrile, a drug that had not yet undergone the full FDA
approval process.191 The issue directly before the Court in Rutherford was
whether the safety and efficacy standards of the FDCA were relevant to the
terminally ill and if there was therefore an implied exemption to the statute for
the terminally ill.192 The Court found that the objectives of the approval
process as noted in the FDCA—namely, assurances that a drug is safe and
effective—were still applicable to those drugs sought by patients who are
terminally ill.193 The Court noted that “federal courts do not sit as councils of
revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own
conceptions of prudent public policy.”194 The Court further stated that
“[w]hether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created is a question for
legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”195
The Court’s decision in Rutherford was also affected by the “substantial
deference” given “the construction of a statute by those charged with its
administration”—in this case, FDA.196 The Court found “[s]uch deference is
particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves
issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to
correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.”197 Since FDA had not
previously made exceptions from its approval process for drugs used by the
terminally ill, the Court noted its reluctance “to disturb a longstanding

190. Id. at 552.
191. Id. at 548.
192. Id. at 554–55. The district court had determined that the record supported the decision of
the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration that laetrile was a new drug under
§ 201(p)(1) of the FDCA and that laetrile was not exempted from the requirements of the FDCA
under a 1938 grandfather clause. Id. at 550. The district court then determined that the record did
not support the Commissioner’s determination that laetrile was not exempted from the
requirements of the FDCA under a 1962 grandfather clause and found that laetrile was exempt
under that clause. Id. The district court alternately held that “denying cancer patients the right to
use a nontoxic substance in connection with their personal health” violated the patients’
constitutional privacy rights. Id. However, the court of appeals did not address the statutory or
constitutional determinations and instead held that “the ‘safety’ and ‘effectiveness’ terms used in
the statute have no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients.” Id. at 550–51.
Therefore, the court only addressed the question of whether the safety and effectiveness terms of
the FDCA applied to terminally ill patients.
193. Id. at 552.
194. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 555.
195. Id. at 559.
196. Id. at 553.
197. Id. at 554.
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administrative policy that comports with the plain language, history, and
prophylactic purpose of the Act.”198
Access to potentially life-saving drugs was also the issue in Abigail
Alliance. In Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision was
an en banc reversal of their previous panel decision.199 In the panel decision,
the court held that there was a constitutional right of access to experimental
drugs for terminally ill patients.200 The court found that where terminally ill
adults had no other government-approved treatment options, those patients’
rights to obtain investigational drugs that had passed Phase 1 of the FDA
approval process were protected by the Due Process Clause.201 The court
distinguished the case from Rutherford, noting that laetrile, the drug at issue in
Rutherford, had not yet cleared Phase 1.202 Therefore, in Rutherford the
government presented a more compelling interest in denying the public access
to the drug, as it had not yet been determined if laetrile was poisonous and
FDA had not yet approved the drug for basic human testing.203 The court in
the Abigail Alliance panel decision, however, determined that the
government’s interest in denying public access to investigational drugs was
weaker because these drugs had passed Phase 1 studies and were deemed safe
for expanded human testing.204 Thus, in its panel decision, the Abigail
Alliance court found that the government’s interest in protecting the public
infringed upon an individual’s liberty to receive investigational drugs.205
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT IN THE EN BANC ABIGAIL ALLIANCE DECISION
The dispute in the panel and en banc Abigail Alliance decisions was the
same: the right of access to investigational drugs for terminally ill patients.206
These patients and their spouses demanded access to drugs that had passed
Phase 1 of the FDA approval process.207 A drug that FDA permits to pass
Phase 1 is considered safe and promising enough for expanded human
testing.208 The Alliance asserted that the right of the terminally ill to have

198. Id.
199. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
200. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486.
206. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
207. Id. at 699.
208. Id. at 701.
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access to drugs that have passed Phase 1 was protected by the Due Process
Clause.209 As such, the Alliance argued that the FDA regulations “preventing
access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients where there is
insufficient evidence of effectiveness or where there is an unreasonable risk of
injury” and “prohibiting drug manufacturers from profiting on the sale of
experimental drugs” should be subjected to strict scrutiny for interfering with a
fundamental constitutional right.210
The Alliance argued that the regulations violated the Constitution by
interfering with the rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.211 Under the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”212 As noted by the court,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the rights protected under the Due Process
Clause to be subject to strict scrutiny.213 Additionally, as the rights protected
by the Due Process Clause are not delineated in the Constitution, the court said
that it was cautioned by the Supreme Court to limit expanding those rights.214
According to the court in Abigail Alliance, the Supreme Court’s
“established method of substantive-due-process analysis” has two requirements
that must be met for a right to be recognized as protected under the Due
Process Clause.215 These two requirements emerged from the Court’s decision
in Washington v. Glucksberg.216 The court in Abigail Alliance noted that the
first requirement is that a right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”217 The second requirement is
that a request for judicial recognition of a due process right provides “a careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”218
The court assumed arguendo that the Alliance met the careful description
requirement and focused on whether the Alliance was able to prove that the
Alliance’s asserted right to drugs for terminally ill patients was sufficiently
supported by “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”219 The
court noted that the Alliance’s claim for constitutional protection rested on two
arguments: first, that “common law and historical American practices have
traditionally trusted individual doctors and their patients with almost complete

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34(b)(3), 312.7 (2008).
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 701.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 702.
Id.
Id. (construing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21).
Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21).
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 702 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21).
Id. at 702–03 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710).
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autonomy to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments” and second, that the
current FDA regulations are “inconsistent with the way that our legal tradition
treats persons in all other life-threatening situations.”220
To support its first argument, the Alliance noted that the government did
not interfere with doctors’ judgments about the efficacy of drugs until the
FDCA was amended in 1962 to include the current FDA approval process.221
The court dismissed this analysis, noting that the Alliance ignored the
“Nation’s history of regulating the safety of drugs.”222 The court examined the
Nation’s early state regulation of drugs, finding that Virginia had regulated
drugs due to safety concerns as early as 1736 and at least twenty-five states or
territories had regulated impure drugs by 1870.223 The court also noted several
examples of federal government intervention in the drug market, beginning
with the Import Drug Act of 1848 that banned “imported adulterated drugs.”224
The court found that the Nation’s history did include regulation of drugs for
safety, and the court noted that some of that regulation did involve regulation
of drug efficacy.225
Even allowing that perhaps the Nation’s history did not show a tradition of
regulating drug efficacy, the court still found the Alliance’s argument
unpersuasive.226 As the court noted, “an arguably limited history of efficacy
regulation . . . does not establish a fundamental right of access to unproven
drugs.”227 Such a limited history of governmental regulation, if alone used to
establish a lack of a traditional governmental interference, could support
“sweeping claims of fundamental rights.”228 Limited history of regulation is
evidence that a right may be “deeply rooted” under the Glucksberg analysis,
but such history does not automatically point to constitutional protection.229
The Alliance also argued that several common law doctrines supported its
argument that restricting access to investigational drugs for the terminally ill
violated the rights of the terminally ill.230 The Alliance argued that the
doctrine of necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the

220. Id. at 703 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 31, Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, No. 045350 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703–04.
224. Id. at 704 (quoting Import Drug Act, Ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
225. Id. at 706.
226. Id.
227. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 706.
228. Id. at 706–07.
229. Id. at 707.
230. Id.
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right to self-defense all lent support to its position.231 The Alliance asserted
that the right of self-preservation present in each common law doctrine would
give the terminally ill the right to use drugs that had been preliminarily judged
safe enough for expanded human testing and promising enough to potentially
save the patients’ lives.232 The court found that each common law doctrine
failed as an analogy to the situation in Abigail Alliance, and the court felt that
none of the doctrines aided the Alliance’s position.233
The court ultimately found the Alliance’s argument for access to
experimental drugs for the terminally ill unsupported.234 The court noted that
the Alliance had not shown that the right to use experimental drugs was deeply
rooted in the Nation’s history.235 The court felt that the Alliance had not
shown that the Nation’s legal traditions, as evidenced by several common law
doctrines, justified allowing citizens a constitutional right to drugs that had not
yet been deemed acceptable for public use.236 The court held that the Alliance
failed to meet the requirements for a fundamental constitutional right under the
Supreme Court’s Glucksberg analysis.237
Since the right sought by the Alliance was not fundamental, the court
found that it was only required to subject the right sought to rational basis
scrutiny.238 Under the rational basis test, the Alliance was required to prove
that the government’s restriction on the right asserted had no rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.239 The court found the Alliance could
not show the regulations challenged had no rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest, as the government does have a valid interest in having a
minimum amount of knowledge about the benefits and risks of a drug and in
preventing citizens from receiving drugs for which the government does not
yet have such minimum knowledge.240 Although the Alliance suggested that
the government’s safety concerns do not apply to terminally ill patients willing
to accept the risks associated with investigational drugs, the court found that
argument unpersuasive.241 The court in Abigail Alliance held that “FDA’s
policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is rationally related to the

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 707.
Id. at 708–10.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id.
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legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from
potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects.”242
The dissent in Abigail Alliance was authored by Judge Judith Rogers, the
author of the majority opinion in the previous panel decision.243 The dissent
was joined by Chief Judge Douglas Ginsberg, the other member of the
majority in the panel decision.244 According to the dissenters, “the court
fundamentally misunderstands the right claimed by the Alliance and trivially
casts it as a function of the regulatory scheme.”245
Judge Rogers and Chief Judge Ginsberg found fault with the majority’s
application of the Glucksberg analysis and found the majority opinion to
contain a “stunning misunderstanding of the stakes.”246 The dissent recast the
Glucksberg historical inquiry into the Nation’s traditions as an investigation
not of governmental regulation of safety but of the right of self-preservation.247
The dissent found that the Alliance had shown a deeply rooted right under
Glucksberg.248 Based on the common law doctrines of self-defense, necessity,
and intentional interference with rescue and congressional deference to those
doctrines, the dissent found that there was a deeply rooted tradition in the
Nation’s history of protecting life by authorizing attempts to save it.249
The dissent also criticized the majority’s reasoning in determining that a
historical absence of governmental regulation does not alone demonstrate that
a right is not fundamental.250 The court found that conclusion unsupported by
the Supreme Court, which has concluded that a right does not have to be
explicitly acknowledged by legislation to be considered “deeply rooted,” and
unheeding of the second prong of the Glucksberg analysis, which requires
specificity in claiming a fundamental right.251 The dissent found that shifting
the inquiry to governmental safety regulation as opposed to governmental
efficacy regulation avoided the sparse history of efficacy regulation.252 The
dissent felt the Alliance presented adequate evidence of the common law
doctrines promoting preservation of life and a national history of access to

242. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713.
243. Id. at 714 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495
F.3d 695. See generally Roger Pilon, Op-Ed., The New Right to Life, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2007, at A11 (stating that Judge Rogers was the author of the panel’s majority opinion).
244. See sources cited supra note 243.
245. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 714.
247. Id. at 716.
248. Id. at 717.
249. Id.
250. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 717 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 718.
252. Id. at 724.
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experimental drugs to meet the first requirement for a fundamental right under
Glucksberg.253
The dissent continued to apply the Glucksberg analysis to the fundamental
right claimed by the Alliance.254 The court moved on through the first prong
of Glucksberg, evaluating whether the right to investigational drugs for the
terminally ill was “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”255 In doing so, the
dissent found that the right sought by the Alliance was bound up with the
notion of liberty.256 The dissent noted that the “[t]he core of liberty is
autonomy,” and that current FDA policy violated the self-determination of
terminally ill individuals.257 The dissent also found that the second prong of
the Glucksberg analysis, the “careful description of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest,” was satisfied by the Alliance: “the Alliance’s liberty claims
are not grounded in the abstract notion of personal autonomy but rather in the
specific right to act to save one’s own life.”258
The dissent believed that the Alliance’s claimed fundamental right of
access to investigational drugs for the terminally ill passed the Glucksberg
test.259 The dissent felt the case should be remanded for a determination of
whether the government can present a compelling enough reason to satisfy the
strict scrutiny test, thereby justifying the fact that the current FDA approval
process infringes on the fundamental constitutional rights of the terminally
ill.260
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION IN ABIGAIL ALLIANCE
AND ITS APPLICATION TO STATE MEDICAL FUTILITY STATUTES
In Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize
a constitutional right for the terminally ill to obtain a promising drug not yet
available to the general public.261 The court upheld FDA’s right to adhere to
the current approval process regulations, passed by the agency under the
FDCA.262 Under these regulations, a drug cannot be offered to the general
public until extensive studies have established its safety and efficacy.263 In

253. Id. at 726–27.
254. Id. at 727.
255. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 727 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 727–28
258. Id. at 716.
259. Id. at 728.
260. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 728 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 697 (majority opinion).
262. Id. at 713.
263. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(b) (2006).
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Abigail Alliance, the court affirmed that the government can restrict the
public’s access to drug treatments through agency-created regulation enacted
under limiting legislation.264
Medical futility statutes seem to operate in a similar fashion, and should
therefore seem to be subject to similar deference by the courts. Under current
state futility statutes, a health care provider can restrict a patient’s access to
medical treatment if the provider feels the treatment sought falls into some
category of medical inappropriateness. The state legislature sets the limits for
access to treatment by passing medical futility statutes, which hospitals then
enforce through their own regulations delineating what constitutes medical
inappropriateness. It would seem that the hospital regulatory decisions should
be subjective to the same judicial deference as FDA’s regulatory decisions.
Determinations of futility under current medical futility statutes are
undeserving of the level of judicial respect that the court showed the FDA
regulations in Abigail Alliance and that courts have generally shown FDA
regulations when those regulations have been questioned. FDA is the
intermediary enforcing the FDCA. An individual hospital is the intermediary
enforcing a state medical futility statute. The court in Abigail Alliance
affirmed the regulations passed by FDA—an administrative agency—to
enforce the FDCA; a court affirming a medical futility decision would be
deferring to the unique determinations of a single hospital under a state
medical futility statute.
While the promulgation of FDA regulations requires the input of a wide
range of parties with varying areas of expertise on a national scale, a medical
futility determination involves the value judgments of a handful of individuals
with the same medical background from the same locality. Since there is no
consensus on what constitutes medical futility, hospital determinations of
futility can vary widely. A state employing a futility statute that uses a clinical
definition of futility entrusts interpretation of the controversial term “medical
inappropriateness” to a single doctor or hospital. A state employing a processbased futility statute depends on a single hospital’s ethics committee to
determine what constitutes medical inappropriateness. In either situation, a
determination of futility is made largely, if not completely, by medical
personnel with no input from the non-medical community. In a medical
futility dispute, which pits the wishes of a patient’s family to prolong life
against the evaluation of the patient’s doctor that the life is not worth
prolonging, consideration of the non-medical values that a family may attach
to a life should not be ignored.
Medical futility decisions do not have procedural safeguards built in that
are equivalent to the administrative regulation approval process. FDA

264. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713.
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regulations undergo an extensive evaluation process.265 This process also
helps to ensure that the regulations achieve the objectives of the statute
authorizing them and that the regulations are worthy of substantial judicial
deference.266 A hospital’s futility determination, if made under a state futility
statute, is not subject to any oversight. While a clinical definition statute may
encourage a hospital to seek a provider willing to continue treatment
considered inappropriate, and while a process-based statute requires such an
inquiry, that investigation is limited to area hospitals to which transfer is
possible. A decision that treatment is futile is, at most, a local consensus
among area hospitals that will not be further evaluated.
Under either current conception of medical futility statute, the role of the
courts has been steered away from the actual issue of futility. Hospitals are
reluctant to rely on medical futility statutes to unilaterally terminate care. As a
result, there are virtually no direct challenges to a decision to terminate
treatment. When medical futility disputes do involve the courts, courts are
asked to look at such questions as the fitness of the surrogate or the possibility
that medical decisions are preempted by federal regulation instead of directly
265. For example, when the FDA revised the regulations governing the new drug approval
process in 1987, part of the revision process involved creating new procedures for reviewing new
drug applications and monitoring the progress of investigational drug use. New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biologic Drug Products Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 8798 (Mar. 19, 1987) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 312, 314, 511, and 514). In the supplemental information released with the text of the
new rule, the FDA noted the thorough research involved in promulgating these regulations:
In preparing the final rule, FDA carefully reviewed more than 50 comments received from
pharmaceutical manufacturers, trade associations, health professionals, professional
societies, and consumer organizations. In addition, FDA managers met with agency
employees in order to gain their views as part of the internal decisionmaking process. The
agency also considered the recommendations of the Congressionally sponsored
Commission on the Federal Drug Approval Process. In preparing the final rule, therefore,
the agency has considered views of persons representing virtually all groups having an
interest in the investigational drug process.
Id.
266. Judicial deference for statutorily authorized agency regulation, even in the absence of
unambiguous congressional delegation, is well-established. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), the Supreme Court held that when a
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit, a court
may not substitute its own construction of the statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of the agency. “[I]n Chevron the Court expressly formulated the
principle of deference to an administrative interpretation when the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue.” Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Construction and
Application of ‘Chevron Deference’ to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3
A.L.R. FED. 2d 25 (2005). The court in Abigail Alliance does not reference Chevron in arguing
for judicial deference to FDA regulations, but Chevron recognized that “[w]hen a challenge to an
agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom
of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by
Congress, the challenge must fail.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
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addressing the provider’s decision. Cases that emerge from clinical definitions
of futility, then, focus on issues other than the evaluation of futility under that
definition. Process-based futility statutes have extra protection to ensure that
physicians’ decisions are consistent with current medical practice, but such
statutes still vest substantive decisions in the hands of a few physicians and fail
to offer adequate judicial recourse to those affected by the decisions. As
exhibited by Texas’s futility statute, the decision of the ethics committee can
only be postponed to allow the patient’s surrogate to find another provider
willing to offer care. Under process-based futility statutes, a determination that
treatment is futile cannot be attacked through the judicial process. Medical
futility statutes based on clinical definitions of futility offer no means of
checking the discretion of a single doctor or hospital, and process-based futility
statutes likewise do not permit the decisions of the ethics committee to be
challenged on the merits. Current state medical futility statutes remove courts
entirely from the question of medical futility, and given that such decisions are
made by only a handful of individuals, those adversely affected by the
decisions should be permitted meaningful judicial recourse.
If current state futility statutes offer inadequate judicial oversight of
decisions that require overseeing, what possible alternatives exist? If a
medical futility determination is made pursuant to a hospital policy, the
patient’s family may turn to the courts for relief based on the merits of their
claim. The history of medical futility has shown that hospitals are reluctant to
make futility determinations based only on hospital policy, however, and the
elimination of state legislation authorizing futility determinations would likely
eliminate all unilateral decisionmaking by providers. To preserve the ability of
providers to terminate medically inappropriate care, the history of futility
disputes has shown that medical futility statutes are required. A new
conception of a state futility statute is needed—one that takes into account a
broader range of values than those of the doctors at a given hospital and one
that gives courts a more meaningful role. This Comment does not provide a
ready solution and only argues that the current statutes are inadequate.
Medical futility statutes and the FDA approval process are not permanently
fixed, and both can be changed through the legislative process to take all
relevant factors into account. The court in Abigail Alliance leaves open the
possibility that the current FDA screening process can be changed, if such
changes are deemed appropriate.267 In fact, in response to Abigail Alliance,
FDA has proposed new guidelines to allow terminally ill patients earlier access

267. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713 (“Although in the Alliance’s view the FDA has
unjustly erred on the side of safety in balancing the risks and benefits of experimental drugs, this
is not to say that the FDA’s balance can never be changed.”).
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to promising treatments.268 The medical futility debate likewise continues, as
states have continued to revise their futility definitions.269 Given the interests
at stake, the continuance of such debate about the value of life should always
be encouraged and broadened to include as many viewpoints as possible.
CONCLUSION
The court in Abigail Alliance found that the Alliance had not proved that a
right to use experimental drugs is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
concluded that it should not “inject[ ] the courts into unknown questions of
science and medicine.”270 Limitations on access to medical treatment exist at
the state level as well, as states have recently enacted laws intended to allow
health care providers to unilaterally terminate inappropriate medical treatment.
The current system of state statutes is flawed, however, as individual hospitals
are entrusted to make substantive decisions about the appropriateness of care
for their patients. The state statute model that commentators have begun to
advocate then offers no opportunity to challenge a decision of medical futility
on its merits. Under current state statutes, the definition of “medically
inappropriate” depends largely on what one group of local doctors believes it
should mean. These decisions should not be subject to the same deference as
the court in Abigail Alliance gave the decisions of the FDA. In Abigail
Alliance, the court expressed a desire that “this debate among the Alliance, the
FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and the public may continue
through the democratic process.”271 As long as there is still the need for such
debate about medical treatment, the courts should not blindly acquiesce to the
judgment of a handful of clinicians whose opinions on morality, quality of life,
and medical risk may not be representative of the communities in which they
live.
ALICIA SEIBEL

268. Ronald L. Trowbridge & Steven Walker, Op-Ed., The FDA’s Deadly Track Record,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2007, at A17.
269. Compare, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-10 (Supp. 2008) (describing “liability of health
care provider[s] or facilit[ies]”: under the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act), with
§ 31-36-8 (2006) (repealed 2007) (describing the “immunity from liability of disciplinary
actions” of anyone who acted in good faith reliance on the directions of a health care agent under
Georgia law pertaining to durable powers of attorney for health care).
270. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713.
271. Id. at 714.
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